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What Drives the Demand for Temporary Agency Workers? 
 
Temporary agency employment has grown steadily in most European countries over the past 
three decades as part of the general trend towards increased employment flexibility. Yet to 
this day, it remains an open question what drives the demand for temporary agency workers. 
The paper examines, first, whether the deregulation of temporary agency employment is 
responsible for the growth of the flexible staffing industry. Second, we investigate the cyclical 
behavior of temporary agency employment. Using monthly data for Germany covering the 
period 1973-2008, we show that the continuous liberalization of this sector is not responsible 
for the surge in temporary agency employment. Our analysis reveals, moreover, that 
temporary agency employment exhibits strong cyclical behavior and correlates with main 
economic indicators in real time. Since most European countries promoted the use of 
temporary agency employment in a similar way, we believe that our results may be 
interesting from an international perspective as well. 
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1.  Introduction 
Germany has experienced substantial  growth in the temporary help industry. Since the 
1970s, the sector has grown on average 10 percent per year. By 2008, it employed nearly 
three percent of the wage and salary workforce. Most of this rise occurred during a period of 
increasing mass unemployment. Although temporary agency employment still accounts for a 
relative small share of paid employment, it plays an important role in job creation: one out of 
four new jobs in 2006 was created in this sector (Jahn 2010). 
Yet Germany is not the only country that has witnessed an impressive rise in temporary 
agency  employment.
1  Temporary  agency  employment  has  doubled in most industrialized 
countries during the past decade. While the sector employed about one percent of  the EU 
workforce at the end of the 1990s, it employed about two percent in 2008 (CIETT 2010). This 
process has made Germany, along with the UK and the Netherlands, one of  the biggest 
markets for temporary help services in Europe. What factors drive the demand for temporary 
agency employment?  
It is the aim of this paper to investigate two factors that might affect the demand for agency 
workers.  First,  the increased  use of agency  employment  may  have been driven by  the 
widespread deregulation of the temporary help service sector at the end of the  1980s, when 
provisions for regular or permanent contracts were left essentially unaltered (e.g., De Graaf-
Zijl and Berkhout 2007, Storrie 2002, OECD 2004). Germany is an interesting country to 
analyze in this respect, since it has liberalized the law on agency employment extensively – in 
total  six  times.  This  process  enables  us  to  investigate  whether  the  gradual  deregulation 
affected the demand for temporary agency workers. Since most European countries promoted 
the use of temporary agency employment in a similar way, we believe that our results may be 
interesting from an international perspective as well. 
                                                 
1   To ease readability, we use the terms ―temp jobs‖ and ―agency work‖ interchangeably with temporary agency 
employment. 3 
There are numerous reasons why firms use temps. The literature has identified several key 
motives: to temporarily replace permanent staff who are on sick leave, to avoid firing costs in 
countries with strict employment protection legislation, to cut costs through the use of temp 
workers, who can be paid lower wages than direct-hire employees, to gain flexibility, or to 
adjust the size of the workforce to the volatility of the business cycle (e.g., Abraham 1990, 
Autor 2003; Houseman et al. 2003, Heinrich et al. 2009). To this day it remains an open 
question whether the growth of agency employment is strongly linked to the business cycle. 
This  issue  has  taken on new importance during the recent  crisis, since  data on the main 
economic indicators, for example, production indices and real GDP, are usually released with 
a time lag of at least one quarter. The number of temporary agency workers, however, could 
in principle be reported in a timelier manner. Moreover, if agency employment is closely 
related to the business cycle or even a leading indicator, the advantage of this indicator would 
be that it is readily available and easy to understand (e.g., Canoy et al. 2008, De Groot et al. 
2005). Temporary agency employment is argued to have a predictive value for the state of the 
economy because user firms react immediately to changes in product demand by releasing or 
hiring agency workers. However, in an economic upturn, the labor supply side might ration 
the  demand  for  agency  workers.  If  this  is  the  case,  agency  employment  might  not  show 
pronounced cyclical behavior. In order to shed light in this issue, we investigate, second, the 
cyclical behavior of temporary agency employment. 
There are only a few studies analyzing the cyclical behavior of agency employment. Up to 
now,  all  available  studies  concentrate  on  the  Dutch  labor  market.  De  Groot  and  Franses 
(2005) find that temporary agency employment and GDP correlate with agency employment 
in real time for the period 1977-2003. Using a composite indicator for the business cycle, 
these results were confirmed by Den Reijer (2006). The drawback of both studies is that they 4 
had to use the number of temp workers employed at Randstad
2 on a quarterly basis, since the 
number of agency workers is only available on a yearly basis in the Netherlands. De  Graaf-
Zilj and Berkhout (2007)  show,  for the period 1969 -2002,  that the demand for agency 
employment precedes Dutch GDP growth. However, their result is ba sed on annual data and 
on a two-variable VAR model. Therefore, the results should be interpreted with care.  
Boockmann and Hagen (2001) provide  indications that agency employment in Germany 
follows a moderately cyclical pattern. They show that the probability of using agency workers 
increases if firms face an unexpected demand shock, while firms adjust their labor force to 
expected  demand  shocks  by  hiring  workers  on  fixed -term  contracts.  However,  their 
observation period (1994-1998) does not even cover  a full  business cycle and is based on 
yearly interviews of firms. Therefore, their finding might be considered very preliminary. 
Regarding the effects of  legislation on the demand of agency workers, there is only one 
study available. Antoni and Jahn (2009) provide evidence on how Germany’s liberalization of 
agency work affected the employment duration of temps with the agency over the period 
1980-2004. They find that the prolongation of the maximum assignment period significantly 
increased average employment duration, while all further liberalizations have reduced  the 
employment tenure of temps.  
If agency employment is considered to be a ―flexible‖ part of the total workforce, higher 
frequency data than annual data are needed for a time series analysis. Moreover, GDP as a 
measure of production may seem to be a too general, aggregate variable. Instead of GDP as 
the  main  business  cycle  indicator,  this  study  uses  an  industrial  production  index  and  the 
number of unemployed workers at monthly frequencies to investigate the relation between 
temporary agency employment and the business cycle and the effects of the deregulation of 
the law covering the temporary agency sector. 
                                                 
2   Randstad is the temporary work agency with the biggest market share in the Netherlands. 5 
The paper is  organized  as  follows. The next  section  discusses how the business  cycle 
affects  the  demand  for  agency  workers.  Section  3  describes  the  regulatory  framework  in 
which  temporary  work  agencies  operate  in  Germany.  Section  4  presents  the  data.  The 
estimation results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 summarizes and concludes. 
2.   Temporary Agency Employment over the Business Cycle 
The central idea of temporary agency employment is to provide increased flexibility to the 
user firm that is ―leasing‖ the worker. By falling back on temps, firms are able to adapt the 
size of their workforce to fluctuations in product demand. The superiority of temporary help 
employment derives from the agencies’ role as matching intermediaries, improving matching 
quality  and  enabling  quick  personnel  adjustments  (e.g.,  Autor  2003,  Houseman  2001, 
Mitlacher 1997, Neugart and Storrie 2006). User firms can return temps to the agencies as 
soon as they become redundant. Labor as a production factor loses its quasi-fixed character 
and becomes a variable cost factor for the leasing company (Oi 1962).  
According to this argument, in an upswing, user firms adjust the size of their workforce to 
an increase in product demand by falling back on temps at first. If the higher product demand 
remains stable and the labor market tightens, firms begin to replace agency workers with 
permanent staff. In a downturn, when output demand falls, firms first dismiss temps before 
starting to lay off their permanent staff. As a consequence, agency work should have a strong 
cyclical component and may be a leading business cycle indicator.  
The  demand  for  temporary  agency  workers  may  also  depend  on  the  regulation  of  the 
temporary help sector itself. Liberalization decreases the quasi-fixed costs of labor in terms of 
either hiring or firing costs, and therefore has  the same effect as decreasing employment 
protection legislation for a subset of the population. Saint-Paul (1996) models a two-tier labor 
market where only insiders with permanent contracts are protected by employment protection 
legislation, and where firms can dismiss workers on temporary (agency) contracts at no cost. 6 
The model predicts that asymmetric reforms that relax regulations only for the subset of the 
flexible  working  population  should  increase  demand  for  the  flexible  workforce  over  the 
business  cycle.  This  effect  is,  of  course,  particular  pronounced  in  countries  with  strict 
employment  protection  legislation  like  Germany,  where  the  majority  of  the  working 
population  enjoys  strong  employment  protection,  while  the  small  segment  of  marginal 
workers remain vulnerable to dismissal decisions by firms. 
However, there are at least three forces that might dampen the cyclical demand for agency 
workers. First, in all European countries, temps usually express a desire for regular open-
ended jobs (CIETT 2002). In an upswing, the probability of finding a regular job increases, 
and workers tend to leave the temp sector to take permanent jobs (e.g., Abraham 1990, Autor 
2001, Burda and Kvasnicka 2006). If the labor market then tightens, temporary work agencies 
are left with low-skilled workers or with workers who prefer flexible working conditions 
(Houseman et al. 2003). Consequently, in a boom, it is likely that the labor supply will ration 
labor demand, at least in the segment of skilled and qualified temporary agency work. 
Second,  how  firms  react  to  output  fluctuations  also  depends  on  the  relative  costs  of 
alternative adjustment instruments. Apart from hiring temp workers or workers on fixed-term 
contracts, firms can also use internal adjustment instruments like overtime, flexible working 
hours, and a short-term increase in labor productivity. An essential factor determining the 
relative  costs  of  the  adjustment  instruments  is,  again,  the  overall  labor  regulation.  For 
example, the use of overtime as an alternative flexibility strategy depends on the capabilities 
of the existing workforce, the qualifications required, and last but not least, the overtime 
premium itself. Consequently, if there are alternative adjustment instruments available that 
are less costly than agency employment might even lag the business cycle. 
Third, the main regulations affecting the demand for flexible workers in most European 
Countries are upper limits on the period for assigning temps to a single user firm, restrictions 
on the number of renewals of an employment contract with a particular agency, and upper 7 
limits  on  the  cumulative  duration  of  temporary  employment  contracts.  Such  regulations 
usually set upper limits on the duration of an assignment to the user firm. In case of a longer-
lasting upturn, temp workers will be less suited to serve as a buffer. Therefore countries with 
strong regulation of the temp sector, like Germany until 2004, should not display a strong 
cyclical pattern. 
3.   Legal Framework 
Changing  labor  law  regulations  can  lead  to  changes  in  the  use  of  agency  workers.  In 
Germany, temporary agency employment is regulated by national legal statutes. The Labor 
Placement Act governs this sector, with specific regulations applying only to temporary help 
agencies. Since the  Labor Placement Act  came into effect  in  1972, it  has  been  amended 
several times (see Table 1). These reforms were mainly designed to increase the flexibility of 
the user firms.  
Unlike most countries, Germany initially permitted agency employment only on the basis 
of a permanent employment contract with the temp agency. In order to prevent agencies from 
circumventing  the  principle  of  an  open-ended  contract,  the  re-employment  ban  and  the 
synchronization ban were included in the legislation. The re-employment ban only permitted 
one-time  termination  and  re-employment.  The  synchronization  ban  required  that  an 
employment contract with a temp exceed the length of the first assignment by at least 25 
percent. The maximum period of assignment was initially limited to three months. In 1982, 
the use of temps in the construction sector was prohibited.  
[Table 1 about here] 
The subsequent three reforms in 1985, 1994, and 1997 gradually increased the maximum 
period of assignment to a user firm from 3 to 12 months. In addition, the reform in 1997 
permitted a one-time synchronization of the employment contract with the agency and the 
first assignment; from this year on, agencies were allowed to conclude fixed-term contracts 8 
with their workers. The reform of 2002 extended the maximum period of assignment up to 
two years. Moreover, it stated that temp workers have the right to the same remuneration as 
workers employed directly by the user firm after working there for more than 12 months. 
The most marked change in the legislation was the recent reform of 2004. This reform was 
intended to increase the remuneration of the agency workers by stipulating equal pay from the 
first day of an assignment on. The new law allows deviation from the principle of equal 
treatment if the agency applies the conditions stipulated in a sectoral collective agreement to 
all its temp workers. In addition, by signing a collective agreement, the agency can free itself 
from all other regulations. As a consequence, numerous collective agreements were concluded 
in anticipation of this reform. By the end of 2003, nearly 97 percent of all temporary help 
agencies paid their temps according to a sectoral collective agreement. Consequently, the 
principle of equal treatment and all other regulations have lost any practical meaning for the 
temporary help industry.  
4.   Data and Descriptive Analysis 
In Germany, temporary work agencies are obliged to report the monthly stock of temps on 
assignment to user firms to the Federal Employment Agency’s ―Labor Placement Statistics‖ 
twice a year. The advantage of the Labor Placement Statistics for our purposes is that the total 
number of temps is available on a monthly basis from January 1973 on. In late 2008, in 
reaction to the economic crisis and to avoid mass layoffs, the German government began 
subsidizing short-term work on a large scale. To avoid any distorting effects, we therefore 
decided to use data only up to June 2008. 
Nevertheless, the Labor Placement Statistics have one disadvantage: as a consequence of 
German reunification and the reorganization of the Public Employment Service, the stock of 
temps refers to West Germany before 1993. Since January 1993, information on the stock of 
temps  is  only  available  for  unified  Germany.  Since  temporary  agency  employment  was 9 
nonexistent in East Germany before the fall of the Berlin Wall, we do not expect that this 
structural break will affect our results. 
According to the Labor Placement Statistics, the number of agency workers increased from 
28,000  in  1973  to  about  794,000 in  June 2008. The labor market flows  suggest  that the 
temporary help industry is even larger than any stock figure, and larger than the industry’s 
share of total employment would suggest. In 2008, about 1,050,000 new temporary agency 
jobs were created and 1,170,000 terminated. 
Temporary agency employment grew on average  about 10 percent per year during the 
observation period; in 2008, temporary help workers constituted three percent of the total 
dependent workforce and two percent of the overall workforce. Most temps are male, which is 
true  for  our  entire  observation  period.  The  share  of  temporary  agency  workers  being 
unemployed directly before they entered into the sector increased markedly from 29 percent 
between 1973 and 1981 to 60 percent during the period 2003 to 2008. More than two-thirds of 
all temps are employed in manufacturing, as laborers or in technical occupations. This pattern 
has been stable since 1973 (Jahn 2010).  
Despite the rather strict regulation of the sector, agency jobs are spot market jobs  that 
provide low remuneration and employment protection for the majority of the workers. Only 
workers with job tenure over six months are covered by employment protection legislation. 
During 1980-2004, only about 20 to 30 percent of agency workers were employed at the same 
agency more than six months (Antoni and Jahn, 2009). Consequently, only a small share of 
the temps was protected against unfair dismissals. Agency workers have to accept an average 
wage differential of about 20 percent (Jahn 2010). This wages disadvantage makes it likely 
that agency workers will leave the sector as soon as they find a better-paid job. 
In order to investigate the cyclical behavior of agency work and to test whether agency 
employment is used as an adjustment instrument to changing demand conditions, we use the 
following indicators: first, since about two-thirds of all temps work in the manufacturing 10 
sector, we use the real growth rate of industrial production (volume index) instead of the GDP 
growth rate. Since the share of temps who were unemployed before accepting a temp job 
increased during our observation period, we use the number of unemployed persons as  a 
second indicator. Compared to the number of employed people, this may be a more adequate 
measure for the business cycle, since we cannot exclude the possibility that temp workers 
substitute permanent employees. All time series variables are for West Germany up to end of 
1992, and afterwards for unified Germany
3. 
Due to German unification and the fact that m acroeconomic variables are often found to 
exhibit non-stationary behavior,  we use the log of the first differences of the variables.  
Finally, since high-frequency data contain some short -run noise, a centered, twelve -period 
moving-average filter has been applied to the time series before differencing the data.
4 
[Figure 1 and 2 about here] 
An initial visual inspection of Figures 1 and 2, which display the g rowth rate of agency 
employment along with our two business cycle indicators ,  confirms  a  clear  procyclical 
pattern. Moreover, it is hard to identify any structural breaks in the time series data, except for 
the year 1982, when temporary agency employment was banned in the construction sector.  
5.   Structural Breaks and Cyclical Behavior 
Did the reforms of the law covering the temporary help sector affect the demand for temps? 
As pointed out in Section 3, with the exception of the reform of 1982, which prohibited 
agency work in the construction sector, all reforms were designed to increase flexibility for 
user firms. Consequently, we would have expected that all reforms after 1982 would have 
                                                 
3   Both variables are provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank and are accessed via Datastream. Moreover, despite 
extensive research, we could only find the yearly GDP growth rate divided into West and East Germany for 
this long time span. We would have lost information by using the GDP growth rate since we had to use the 
overall annual data. Furthermore, the number of employed workers is only available on a monthly basis from 
1991 on. 
4   Note that the moving average filter is ―smoothing‖ the series more than just seasonally adjusting the data by 
X11, and thus the smoothed time series depicts the procyclicality of agency employment more clearly. 11 
increased  the  demand  for  temps.  The  reforms  of  1997  and  2004  were  particularly  far-
reaching, and the effects should be pronounced. 
As first steps, we analyzed the monthly data using ARIMA models, including dummy-
breaks and intervention variables as well as Chow tests for breaks in intercepts and/or trends. 
We included seasonal adjustments by X11 and detrended the data using a Hodrick-Prescott 
filter. Despite these efforts, we could not identify any relation between the time of the reforms 
and the demand for temps.  
However, some sub-periods proved to be characterized by a close to linear development, 
and we therefore applied the Bai-Perron (2003) test for structural breaks. The advantage of the 
Bai-Perron test is that it allows for breaks at unknown dates in the intercept and trend. The 
Bayesian  Information  Criteria  (BIC)  selects  seven  breaks,  which  are  shown  in  Figure  3. 
However, with the exception of the 1982 reform, these break points are small and not strongly 
related to the reforms of the Labor Placement Act. The break point in 4/1994 is closely related 
to the reform of January 1994 and the break point in 11/2001 could be related to the reform 
that took place in January 2002. However, the latter break point indicated that the demand has 
decreased, which is not in accordance with our expectation. To sum up, it seems that the 
deregulation of the sector is not responsible for the growth in agency employment in Germany 
since the 1970s. 
In  order  to  examine  whether  temporary  agency  employment  is  a  leading  economic 
indicator, we perform bivariate Granger causality tests. As the level values are found to be 
non-stationary, we use first-differenced values. If the industrial production index (number of 
unemployed) explains the number of temps and if reversing the variables in the regression 
reveals that agency employment does not influence industrial production (unemployment), a 
hypothesis of Granger causality from industrial production (unemployment) to agency work 
cannot be excluded.  12 
We run the causality test for the full sample and separately for the pre- and post-unification 
periods.  An  F-test  is  used  to  ascertain  whether  lags  of  the  industrial  production  index 
significantly help to explain the number of agency workers and vice versa. We perform a 
similar  set  of  tests  for  our  second  business  cycle  indicator,  representing  the  number  of 
unemployed people.  
Furthermore, the Geweke, Meese, and Dent causality test is used, which is based on the 
same H0-hypothesis as the Granger test but performed by testing leads instead of lags. The 
number of lags included has been decided based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC) 
and the Schwartz criterion (SC): we selected a lag level of eight months by minimizing the 
values of these information criteria. 
Table 2 presents the results for the two sets of Granger causality tests, where the variables 
were first seasonally corrected by using the X11 procedure. For the entire sample period, 
industrial  production  Granger-causes  agency  employment  and  vice  versa,  which  might 
suggest a strong cyclical movement. For the post-unification period, both tests suggest that 
causation runs from industrial production to agency employment when requiring at least a 5 
percent level of significance. This result is not in accordance with the expectation that agency 
employment  is  a  leading  economic  indicator.  For  our  second  indicator,  the  number  of 
unemployed, there seems to be some bi-directional causality and, with some variation, also 
with respect to the second sub-period. 
[Table 2 about here] 
The Granger test is designed to handle pairs of variables, and may produce misleading 
results when the true relationship involves more variables. We therefore estimate a three-
variable VAR. In this case, possible directions of causality can be tested by including all 13 
variables  simultaneously.
5  All variables in the   VAR  model  are treated symmetrically by 
including an equation for each variable explaining its evolution based on its own lags and the 
lags of all the other variables .  In  our  case,  the variables  agency  employment, industrial 
production,  and unemployment have been selected . We  expect, first, that the  demand for 
temps is positively  influenced by real production, and second  that temporary employment 
may fall if the level of unemployment is low. The reason for the latter expectation is that  in 
this case, labor supply may ration labor demand. The VAR can be written in a compact form 
as: 
t p t p t t X A X A A X          1 1 0       (2) 
The 3x1 vector  t X  represents first-difference log values of our three variables. In order to 
find the appropriate lag length, the model is tested down, beginning with lag length of order 
twelve  (months),  and  subsequently  stepwise  reducing  to  the  order  to  six  months .  A 
multivariate generalization of the AIC and the SC tests is applied as a test statistic for lag 
length.  Moreover,  a  likelihood  ratio  (LR)  test  is  used  to  decide  upon  the  number  of  lags 
included in the VAR model, since the AIC/SC criteria in some cases indicate a very short lag 
structure.  In  most  cases,  a  lag  level  of  6  seems  most  appropriate  when  taking  into 
consideration both  the  AIC/SC criteria and the  LR test. Table 3  reports  the causality test 
values when all variables are included simultaneously in the VAR model. 
[Table 3 about here] 
For the whole sample period, Table 3 indicates bi-directional Granger causality between 
agency  employment  and  industrial  production  and  between  agency  employment  and 
unemployment. The sign of the total impact from all parameter estimates in the VAR model is 
                                                 
5  Since the question of causality is included in the present analysis and since the parameters in the VAR model 
are not significant and robust, we do not undertake an impulse response function analysis in the following. 
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reported in brackets. The results show that increases in industrial production imply increasing 
temporary agency employment, but the reverse relation is significant as well. In some cases, 
the impact is close to zero, indicated by a ―0‖ in brackets, although statistically, the parameter 
estimates  are  found  to  be  significant.  For  the  second  sub-period,  these  results  are  partly 
confirmed.  These  results  correspond  to  the  graphs  in  Figures  1  and  2,  where  the  cross-
correlations between the respective variables attain the highest values at lag zero, i.e., the co-
movements take place more or less simultaneously between the respective variables. 
To investigate whether our results are robust, we used the number of employed workers 
and the Ifo climate index instead of the industrial production index. Since both variables are 
only available on a monthly basis from 1991 on, we only investigated the relationship for our 
second sub-period. Table 4 presents the results for the Granger Causality test. While total 
employment  does  not  cause  agency  employment  and  vice  versa,  we  found  a  relationship 
between  the  Ifo  climate  index  and  temporary  agency  employment,  again  indicating  that 
temporary agency employment is at least not a leading indicator. 
[Table 4 about here] 
As further robustness checks we used the DAX and the real growth rate of GDP instead of 
the  industry  production  index.
6  We  also  ran  the  estimations  only  for  temps  who were 
employed in the manufacturing sector.  Finally, since laborers, who are likely assigned more 
often on a daily basis, are part of the manufacturing sector, we performed the analysis 
separately for laborers and the remaining workers in the manufacturing sector. It turns out that 
our results remain mainly the same. 
                                                 
6   Note that for our observation period the growth rate of the GDP is only available on a yearly basis. 15 
6.   Summary and Conclusion 
A commonly accepted theory is that the increase in temporary agency employment in most 
European  countries  is  merely  a  consequence  of  the  widespread  lifting  of  regulations 
governing this sector. We tested this hypothesis using longitudinal data on temporary agency 
employment for Germany, which reformed its regulations six times since 1973, while leaving 
provisions for regular contracts in place. Our analysis showed that the deregulation of the law 
was not responsible for the increased demand for agency workers.  
Second, the paper has shown that the demand for agency workers is highly procyclical. 
Changes in the state of the economy seem to run parallel with changes in the demand for 
agency  workers.  Moreover,  we  could  not  find  evidence  supporting  the  view  that  agency 
employment is a leading economic indicator. However, as Canoy et al. (2009) point out, this 
finding does not disqualify temporary agency employment as a leading indicator. Countries 
that  release  the  number  of  agency  workers  faster  and  more  frequently  than  traditional 
economic indicators will still be able to predict the state of the economy in a timelier and 
more accurate manner. 
The increase in the demand for agency employment, together with its strong procyclical 
pattern, might be treated as evidence that user firms are making increased use of flexible staff 
to adjust to unexpected shocks or business cycle conditions. This might be especially the case 
in countries like Germany, where temps are predominantly found in the production sector – 
one where international competition is fierce.  
In Germany, every time the regulation of temporary agency employment is about to be 
changed, heated and prolonged battles take place between interest groups, the labor parties, 
and politicians. It usually takes a great deal of time and tremendous bargaining effort before 
the parties finally agree on what are often very marginal reforms. The same holds at the 
European  level.  At  the  end  of  2008,  the  European  Parliament  approved  a  proposal  for  a 
directive on agency employment after nearly 20 years of bargaining. Our results call into 16 
question such substantial investments of time and resources, since the market does not seem 
to react strongly to these reforms. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1:    Major reforms of the labor placement act 
Period  Regulation 
Aug 7, 1972  Temporary agency employment was allowed 
starting Jan 1, 1982  Prohibition of temporary agency employment in the construction sector 
starting May 1, 1985  Extension of the maximum period of assignment (3 to 6 months) 
starting Jan 1, 1994  Extension of the maximum period of assignment (6 to 9 months) 
starting  April  1, 
1997 
Extension of the maximum period of assignment (9 to 12 months), 
Permission of one-time synchronization of employment contract and first assignment 
Permission to conclude fixed-term contracts (max. 3 prolongations) 
starting Jan 1, 2002  Extension of the maximum period of assignment (12 to 24 months), 
Principle of equal treatment after 12 months 
starting Jan 1, 2004  Principle of equal treatment 
Elimination of the maximum period of assignment 
Elimination of the synchronization and re-employment ban  
Exception of the principal of equal treatment if the agency applies a collective agreement 




Figure 1: Temporary agency employment and industrial production 
 
Notes: The level values of the variables are smoothed by a 12-period centered moving average; 
first differences of log values are displayed at the vertical axis. 



















































































Temp Industrial production19 
Figure 2: Temporary agency employment and unemployment 
 
Notes: The level values of the variables are smoothed by a 12-period centered moving average; 
first differences of log values are displayed at the vertical axis. 
Source: Datastream (Variable: BDUNPTOTP) and Labor Placement Statistics 
 
Figure 3: Temporary agency workers, 1973-2008 (log values) 
 
Notes: The linear trend segments detecting by using a procedure for detecting structural breaks 
developed  by  Bai  and  Perron  (2003).  Allowing  up  to  ten  break  points—with  unknown  break 
points—the BIC information criteria select seven breaks with the breaks as indicated in the graph. 










































































































































































































































Table 2: Pairwise causality tests, 1973-2008 
 
1973-2008 
Granger / GMD 
1973-1992 
Granger / GMD 
1993-2008 
Granger / GMD 




















































Notes:  Log values of the variables measured in first differences are used, where the number of lags is eight, and a 
dummy included for 1992:12 due to German unification. p-values are reported in parentheses, * indicates 
significance at at least the 10 percent level, and ** at least the 5 percent level. 
 
 
Table 3: Causality tests in a three-variable VAR model, 1973-2008 
  Dependent variable 
  Temp  Industrial production  Unemployment 
1973-2008:             
Temp    -  2.21**  (0.04) [+]  4.01**  (0.00) [-] 
Industrial production   3.09**  (0.01) [+]  -  1.76*  (0.10) [0] 
Unemployment    4.31**  (0.00) [-]  0.56  (0.75)  - 
1973-1992:             
Temp    -  1.21  (0.30)  2.63**  (0.02) [-] 
Industrial production   1.92*  (0.08) [+]  -  1.55  (0.16) 
Unemployment    1.38  (0.23)  1.64  (0.14)  - 
1993-2008:             
Temp    -  2.17**  (0.05) [+]  2.46**  (0.03) [0] 
Industrial production   1.95*  (0.08) [+]  -  2.31**  (0.04) [-] 
Unemployment   0.86  (0.52)  3.41**  (0.00) [0]  - 
Notes: Log values of the variables measured in first differences are used in the tests, where the number of lags is 
initially set to ten. The final number of lags is chosen to be six as a compromise for all the three models, as the 
AIC/SBC information criteria indicates short lags and a likelihood ratio test concerning restricting the lag length 
selects longer lags. A dummy variable is included for 1992:12 due to unification.  p-values are reported in 
parentheses, * indicates significance at at least the 10 percent level, and ** at least the 5 percent level. The sign 
in brackets indicates the direction of causality, based on the sign and values of the parameter estimates in the 
VAR. [0] indicates a close to zero impact between the variables, although the combined test in some cases 





Table 4: Pairwise causality tests, 1993-2008 
  Granger / GMD    Granger / GMD 


















Notes: Log values of the variables measured in first differences are used, where the number of lags is 8. p-
values are reported in parentheses, * indicates significance at at least the 10 percent level, and ** at least 
the 5 percent level. The sign in brackets indicates the direction of causality, based on the sign and values 
of  the  parameter  estimates  in  the  VAR.  [0]  indicates  a  close  to  zero  impact  between  the  variables, 
although the combined test in some cases indicates a significant relationship. 
 